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Abstract. We present a model of steganographic systems which allows to
evaluate their security. We especially want to establish an analogy to the
known-plaintext-attack which is commonly used to rate cryptographic systems.
This model´s main statement is that the embedding operation of a
steganographic system should work indeterministic from the attacker´s point of
view. This is proved by means of information theory.
Index Terms: Security and modeling of steganography, entropy,
indeterminism, secret communication, hidden communication
1   A short introduction to steganography
Bruce Schneier characterizes steganography in the following way [1]: "Steganography
serves to hide secret messages in other messages, such that the secret´s very existence
is concealed." He also states some historic examples, such as "…invisible inks, tiny
pin punctures on selected characters, minute differences between handwritten
characters, pencil marks on typewritten characters, …".
These examples show that steganography itself is not a new technique. However, it
experiences a renaissance due to the ubiquitious use of computers and multimedia;
especially when graphical and audio data are involved. Consequently, most available
implementations of steganographic algorithms work on graphics or sound.
In Figure 1 we illustrate the use of steganography on images.
                                                          
♣ The work was sponsored by the German Ministry of Education, Science, Research and
Technology and the Gottlieb-Daimler- and Karl-Benz-Foundation Ladenburg (Germany).
Fig. 1. Steganography with graphical data
On the left you can see the sender, who embeds the secret message into a graphic
file (the "original"). She then transmits this modified file (here named "modified
image") to the recipient shown on the right side. The attacker (at the bottom)
intercepts this transmission. Only the recipient should be able to extract the message in
the correct way. Of course this is possible only if there is a shared secret between the
sender and the recipient. This could be for instance the algorithm for extraction itself
or special parameters of the algorithm, e.g. keys.
2   Steganography vs. cryptography
How do steganography and cryptography compare? The purpose of both is to provide
secret communication. Cryptography hides the contents of a secret message from an
attacker, whereas steganography even conceals the existence of this message.
Therefore the definition of breaking the system is different. In cryptography, the
system is broken when the attacker can read the secret message (for the point under
discussion it does not matter how he does this).
Breaking a steganographic system has two stages:
1. The attacker can detect that steganography has been used.
2. Additionally, he is able to read the embedded message.
In our definition a steganographic system is insecure already if the detection of
steganography is possible (first stage).
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3   Related work
3.1   The basic model of a steganographic system
The model in Figure 2 is based on the results of the discussions at the Information
Hiding Workshop in Cambridge [2], which were continued in [3] and [4]. We will call
this model the Embedding Model.
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fE: steganographic function "embedding"
fE
-1: steganographic function "extracting"
cover: coverdata in which emb will be hidden
emb: message to be embedded
key: parameter of fE
stego:coverdata with embedded message
Fig. 2. The Embedding Model
The input cover represents the untreated original data, emb the ones which will be
embedded into cover by the function fE. The resulting data called stego contain the
message emb. The operation fE
-1
 extracts the embedded data to emb* and also produces
an output cover*. Naturally, emb* should be equal to emb and in most cases cover* is
the same as stego. For concelation systems, cover* is not of much interest anyway.
This model was not meant to be a model for evaluating the security of
steganographic systems (or stegosystems for short) by the participants of the
workshop. They merely tried – for a beginning – to put the ad-hoc knowledge of
steganography into a more abstract form, for which purpose the figure shown serves
quite well.
Therefore the above model is not of much use if you want to evaluate the security
of a steganographic system. You can see the acting entities, the processing functions
and their in- and output, as described in Chapter 1. But there are no comments on the
behavior of the function fE and the knowledge and capabilities of possible attackers.
3.2   Information theoretic setting
In the following we will evaluate the model from Chapter 3.1 by means of information
theory. In "On the limits of steganography" [5] there is a chapter which addresses this
approach. The authors argue with the entropy of cover, emb and stego, just like we
will do, but don´t go further into detail. They had a different goal with their paper:
while we would like to present a commonly valid model for steganographic systems
(and prove its validity by means of information theory), they do concentrate on the
practical issues of steganography. Consequently the mentioned chapter is rather short
and does not contain an actual proof for the (of course reasonable) statements which
are made.
Another interesting approach to information theoretic evaluation of steganography
can be found in [6].
4   Using information theory to evaluate the security of steganogra-
phic systems
Borrowing from cryptology, we introduce two forms of attacks on steganographic
systems:
1. stego-only-attack: The attacker knows only stego.
2. stego-cover-attack: The attacker knows both stego and cover.
We will concentrate on the second attack in analogy to the known-plaintext-attack
on cryptographic systems where the attacker is allowed to know every in- and output
except the key and still should not be able to break the system. In addition, the first
attack is a special case of the second and thus included in our further considerations.
It seems obvious that the attacker can detect differences between cover and stego if
he gets to know both of them. If the differences are caused only by fE he can break the
system easily. To avoid this, the first solution is: The attacker must not know cover.
This can be proved by means of information theory:
The embedding process can be described as the function
stego = fE(cover, emb, key).
We assume a cover of m bits in which we want to "hide" n bits and the following
notation:
C the set of all bitstrings
cover actual bitstring of length m (cover ∈ C)
E the set of all bitstrings
emb actual bitstring of length n (emb ∈ E)
K the set of all keys
key actual key (key ∈ K)
S the set of all bitstrings (S = C)
stego actual stego, i.e. bitstring that contains emb (stego ∈ S)
For a given alphabet X the entropy H(X) describes the "uncertainty about X". That
actually means the uncertainty about the occurrence of a certain element x∈X 1. The
conditional entropy H(X|Y) is the remaining uncertainty about X when knowing Y. The
joint entropy H(X,Y) = H(X) + H(Y|X) is the "union" of both entropies. The mutual
information I(X;Y) describes the amount of information about X you get if you know
Y; I(X;Y) = H(X) – H(X|Y) [7].
The attacker does
− suppose that some emb is hidden in stego,
− know the steganographic functions,
− have the knowledge and abilities to perform an attack on the stegosystem,
− have unlimited time and resources.
If in spite of all his efforts the attacker can not confirm his hypothesis that emb is
hidden we will call the system "information theoretically secure".
4.1   Why deterministic steganography can´t be secure
The stegosystem is information theoretically secure if the attacker cannot gain any
information about emb or E by examining stego and cover (or S and C, respectively).
Thus, the mutual information is zero:
I(E;(S,C)) = H(E) – H(E|(S,C)) = 0. (1)
That gives the fundamental security condition:
H(E|(S,C)) = H(E). (2)
That means that the uncertainty about E – the entropy H(E) – must not be decreased
by the knowledge of S and C. Conclusion: E has to be independent from S and C.
Is it possible to meet this condition? It seems logical that – with the given
assumptions – an attacker gains knowledge about a hidden emb just by comparing the
corresponding cover and stego. We can assume that not only the alphabets S and C but
also their entropies H(S) and H(C) are equal. There are differences in the conditional
entropies, however:
− without embedded information: H(S|C) = H(C|S) = 0,
− with embedded information: H(S|C) = H(C|S) > 0.
The connection of uncertainty and information allows us to say: the uncertainty
about S, if we know C (or vice versa) corresponds to the information about E that you
can get by looking at S and C. Therefore, by embedding emb∈E into cover∈C we
have a mutual information
I(E;(S,C)) = H(E) – H(E|(S,C)) > 0. (3)
                                                          
1 Keep this relationship in mind when we partly look on only the alphabets in the following.
It follows:
H(E|(S,C)) < H(E). (4)
This means that the security condition is not fulfilled. Therefore, the necessary and
sufficient condition for secure steganography is:
H(S|C) = H(C|S) = 0. (5)
This condition can be met only when
 ∀i∈Ν, stegoi∈S, coveri∈C : stegoi = coveri.
Thus the steganography is reduced to a practically irrelevant special case2. If we
exclude this case, it follows:
The security condition (2) can not be fulfilled under the given assumptions. This
basically means that secure steganography is impossible when both cover and stego
are known to the attacker.
4.2   Indeterminism and steganography
An advanced solution to this problem is to have an indeterministic embedding
operation. An indeterministic operation or process gives different results (within a
certain range) every time it is computed. In other words, it contains randomness.
Information theory supports this approach:
As stated above, it is impossible to provide information theoretically secure
steganography if the attacker knows cover and stego (respectively C and S). Therefore
we establish the following condition: When the attacker knows S, there remains an
uncertainty about C, so that H(C|S) > 0. For that we introduce a new alphabet from
which the actual cover is selected. We call this alphabet CS or Source.
The effect of introducing CS into the Embedding Model is shown in Figure 3. We
assume that fE, CS and S (or stego) are publicly known, whereas K and C (respectively
key and cover) are unknown to attackers.
Since the actual cover is selected from CS, we assume C ⊆ CS. In addtion, we
assume H(CS) ≥ H(C), which is both plausible for any selection and neccesary to
achieve the intended indeterminism. It says that the uncertainty about the realisation of
an actual cover from CS must be greater than or equal to that about a realisation from
C.
                                                          
2 This case is cover ≡ stego: You have to find a cover that already contains emb.
6HOHFWLRQ UDQGRPVHOHFWLRQRIDQDFWXDOFRYHUIURPWKHVRXUFH&6
Fig. 3. Selection of covers from a source
The necessary uncertainty about C is then achieved by selecting every cover in a
truly random process and keeping it secret afterwards. One example for such a process
is the sampling of analog input, e.g. speech or images. The inaccuracy of the
quantization provides the needed uncertainty. If the changes of cover during the
embedding process remain within this range, the manipulations cannot be detected.
In analogy to the proof given before the fundamental security condition is:
H(E|(S,CS)) = H(E), (6)
what means that the uncertainty about E – the entropy H(E) – must not be decreased
by the knowledge of S and CS, in other words: E has to be independent from S and CS.
How can this condition be fulfilled? The attacker should not be able to detect
changes in cover which are due to the embedding process by examining stego.
Therefore we need a certain amount of uncertainty about cover, what means
H(C|S) > 0. The necessary amount results from the relation between conditional
entropy and mutual information:
H(C|S) ≥ I(E;(S,C)) = H(E) – H(E|(S,C)). (7)
If we assume the worst case that the attacker can determine E completely from S
and C, we get:
H(E|(S,C)) = 0.
It follows that
H(C|S) ≥ H(E). (8)
This can be interpreted in the following way: Because the mutual information can
be at most the size of H(E), the necessary uncertainty about C must be at least the
same size to make an attack on S impossible.
The same applies of course to attacks on CS. Therefore we assume
H(C|CS) = H(C|S) (9)
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H(C|CS) ≥ H(E). (10)
With these conditions we need a joint entropy
HO = H(C,CS) = H(C) + H(CS|C). (11)
Because C ⊆ CS and H(CS) ≥ H(C), it follows
H(CS|C) ≥ H(C|CS).
When considering these relations we get a lower bound for the necessary joint
entropy:
HO ≥ H(C) + H(C|CS).
Using (10), we get
HO ≥ H(C) + H(E). (12)
Since H(CS) ≥ H(C), we assume H(CS,S) ≥ H(C,S). From this follows:
H(CS|S) ≥ H(C|S). (13)
According to Equation (8) it follows that the security-relevant bound
H(CS|S) ≥ H(E) (14)
can be met. We may draw the following conclusion: When you observe the lower
bounds for H(C|S) (Equation (8)) and H(C|CS) (Equation (9)), attacks with knowledge
of S and CS (stego-source-attack) to prove the existence of E in S are not successful:
The fundamental security condition (6) can be fulfilled.
Additionally we look at the conditions under which the stegosystem is secure when
it is attacked via K. Therefore we require that an attacker (who knows S and CS) can
not obtain any information about (K, E)3. This can be expressed as follows:
I((K,E);(S,CS)) = H(K,E) – H((K,E)|(S,CS)) = 0
= H(K,E) – H(K|(S,CS)) – H(E|(S,CS,K)) = 0.
(15)
When taking into account that H(E|(S,CS,K)) = 0, we get:
H(K|(S,CS)) = H(K,E) 
or
H(K|(S,CS)) = H(E) + H(K|E) ≥ H(E), (16)
respectively.
We can conclude from the proof above that cover must contain an uncertainty for
the attacker to allow secure steganography between sender and recipient.
Furthermore the proof shows that information theoretically secure steganography is
possible, if two conditions are met:
                                                          
3 Although this requirement is actually too strong, it can be chosen for the theoretic approach,
because we weaken it in the result (see Equation (14)).
1. Knowledge of CS and S must not decrease the uncertainty of an attacker about E
and emb (see Equation (6)):
H(E|(S,CS)) = H(E|S) = H(E).
To achieve this, the following constraints (compare Equations (12), (8) and (14))
apply:
HO = H(C,CS) ≥ H(C) + H(E),
H(C|S) ≥ H(E),
H(CS|S) ≥ H(E).
2. The conditional entropy of the key must be greater or equal to H(E) to prevent an
attack via K (see Equation (16)):
H(K|(S,CS)) ≥ H(E).
A third condition can be established (receiver condition): For the receiver (who
knows key ∈ K) there must not be any uncertainty about emb ∈ E:
H(E|(S,CS,K)) = H(E|(S,K)) = 0.
5   Introducing indeterminism into the steganographic function
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the embedding has to be indeterministic to
provide security against attackers who get to know the in- and output of the system.
The solution is to split the steganographic process "embedding" into an
indeterministic and a deterministic part. These parts must not be distinguishable by the
attacker and therefore have to take place in a trusted domain of the sender.
When, for example, the sender takes a digital image with an electronic camera, an
attacker may know the scene which is depicted and the camera exactly. But the
attacker – and even the sender – does not know the position of the camera and the
direction it was pointed in a sufficiently exact manner (turning the camera even by a
fraction of a degree results in a different image [8]). Thus, if the attacker gets hold of a
digital image he is unable to decide whether the picture is an original one or has been
treated by a steganographic system.
Another example is the sampling of analog data we already mentioned in Chapter
4. When the sender takes samples of one analog waveform several times, he is
extremely unlikely to get exactly the same digital data each time. This phenomenon is
due to the inaccuracy of analog-digital-converters and the characteristics of
quantization. If the function fE mimics the process of sampling in a sufficiently exact
manner, nobody without the key is able to decide whether a given digital sample
contains steganographic data or not.
In both cases the preprocessing fP (e.g. camera positioning, sampling) introduces
randomness into the cover data. fP can even be a product of multiple operations. The
first of the above cases gives an example: It contains a sampling step, too.
The considerations so far lead us to a refined model of steganography which
features a preprocessing fP in addition to the embedding function fE:
fP: preprocessing
r: random part of cover introduced by fP (may be parameter of fP, but does not
have to)
Fig. 4. Model with preprocessing
The difference to the Embedding Model shown in Figure 2 is the enhanced view on
steganography. We no longer concentrate on only the steganographic core function fE
but look at the whole steganographic system. In the Embedding Model the attacker
simply must not know cover for secure steganography. This is true for the model
above as well, but with the parameter Source we model the uncertainty of the attacker
about cover. This allows a more exact evaluation of steganographic systems.
The gray area in Figure 4 marks a trusted domain which the attacker cannot intrude.
You can see that he may know Source and emb and still should be unable to detect the
steganography if he does not know key.
We would like to illustrate the concept of the trusted domain with an example: the
ISDN telephony network. ISDN gives bit-transparent transport of digital data, which
is crucial for secret communication with steganography. Imagine an ISDN telephone
with analog-digital conversion and steganography integrated into one chip: Naturally
the analog sound is Source, the digitized speech is cover and the voice-sampling is the
preprocessing fP. Whether the output of the integrated chip is stego or cover cannot be
determined from the outside. An attacker may know Source, emb and even the
characteristics of the sampling chip, but it does not help him to decide whether the
output contains emb or not.
Now imagine the sampling and the steganography on different chips. If the attacker
is able to eavesdrop the in- and output of the steganography chip alone, he is of course
able to detect the use of steganography because he knows the actually used cover.
Therefore, both chips have to be inside a trusted domain of the sender. In the first case
the integrated chip serves as this trusted domain.
It seems obvious that the embedding function fE should be implemented according
to the characteristics of the preprocessing. If, for instance, fP introduces white noise
into the least significant bits of cover (as  most analog-digital-converters do), then the
embedding should spread emb over these bits of cover in a way that resembles white
noise. Other processes may require completely different embedding techniques.
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6   Conclusions
We can name two necessary conditions for secure steganography:
1. Key remains unknown to the attacker.
2. The attacker does not know the actual cover.
How can we guarantee this? The concealment of key corresponds to the one of
symmetric cryptosystems. The second point is at first sight simply a condition to be
met. As an alternative we can assume a set of input data named Source, from which
the stegosystem chooses the actual cover. The attacker knows only Source. This model
is well suited for the implementation of actual steganographic systems because the
embedding can be tuned to fP. The embedding exploits the randomness introduced by
fP and thus provides secure steganography. To implement a good steganographic
function you naturally have to have as much knowledge about the preprocessing as
possible.
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